Abstract
Excerpted From: Jonathan Zasloff, Left and Right in the Middle East: Notes on the Social Construction of Race, 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 201 (Fall 2006) (251 Footnotes) (Full Document)
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict sometimes churns out irony as prodigiously as violence. In late 2003, Israelis found themselves receiving support and a solidarity visit from Gianfranco Fini, the leader of the National Alliance, the Italian political party that is the successor to Mussolini's fascists--a visit that the Israelis pointedly did not reject. Meanwhile, European social democrats took pains to honor Yasir Arafat and support the Palestinian Authority (PA), which maintained a brutal human rights record under his direction.
These ironies usually go unnoticed because they reflect perhaps the conflict's only uncontested political fact: generally speaking, the Left backs the Palestinians and the Right supports the Israelis. There are exceptions, but the overall pattern is clear.
The American Right's support for the Jewish state has become commonplace. Conservative politicians, such as Tom Delay and Sam Brownback, addressed the Knesset, and evangelical support for Zionism fits nicely into their sometimes-apocalyptic world view. Rightwing support of Israel is, however, broader than a contemporary American phenomenon, and stems from more than religion. In the early 1980s, Ronald Reagan cemented a close relationship with Israel's Likud government, even though Reagan himself did not share the religious views of his conservative Christian supporters. (Jimmy Carter, the president who identified himself as born-again while in office, had consistently poor relations with Jerusalem.) Across the Atlantic, the pattern also holds. In England, Margaret Thatcher moved London much closer to Israel. More recently, Israelis applauded the European Union (EU) Presidency of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, and Belgium's far-right leader, Filip Dewinter, loudly proclaims that Jews are his 'brothers in arms.'
The Left (as always) is somewhat more complicated, mainly because of pro-Israel American liberals, and the Democratic Party's staunch support for the Jewish state. But here, too, the Left's pattern of support is clear. In the late 1970s, Jesse Jackson spearheaded the American Left's embrace of Arafat, both literally and figuratively. Britain's left-leaning Guardian newspaper, which pioneered support for Israel in the first part of the century, 'is now is now one of Israel's harshest critics' and '[t]he BBC, a bastion of the soft left establishment, has also been criticised for its bias against Israel.' Ralph Nader has referred to Israel as the “puppeteer” of the U.S. government, and called for ending American aid to the Jewish state. The left-liberal The New York Review of Books has become the central address of respectable anti-Israel opinion, regularly publishing such voices as Tony Judt, Henry Siegman, and Robert Malley--all of whom squarely blame Israel for the current negotiations impasse. For decades, The Nation gave prominent and valuable column space to the late Edward Said--and not because of his reputation as a literary critic. In the wake of Hamas' victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections, The Nation called for resuming negotiations where they left off in 2000 and confidently predicted a positive response--even though Hamas firmly rejects the entire Oslo framework. The New Republic, which The Nation dwarfs in circulation, is often accused of being “neoconservative” on Middle East policy precisely because it is staunchly pro-Israel. It finally reached the point where Michael Walzer, who has unquestionable progressive credentials, had to criticize his ideological compatriots for what he saw as a blind anti-Israel bias.
Walzer also might have pointed to an equal and opposite bias on the right. But the problem is more than bias; both the Left and the Right have perverted their own ideologies when examining the Middle East. Closer examination of the Israeli and Palestinian positions on key issues reveals that the current, nearly lockstep positions make little sense: the Left should identify more closely with the Jewish state, and the Right should see important aspects of its own ideology in the Palestinian position. Powerful arguments exist for a substantial political realignment.
The persistence of these anomalies derives from the powerful and perverse influence of race on the debate. Racial politics has moved both left and right into taking positions that sit uneasily with their ideological commitments. This racial thinking, however, relies not on facts but rather on an elaborate social construct--a construct that, I argue, stems from long-outdated Cold War and inter-Arab rivalries. Partisans on both sides may see themselves as engaged in a pressing struggle; but, just as much, they are echoing the battles of the past.
How did all of this happen? And why should lawyers care? This Article suggests that legal theory provides a particularly incisive prism through which to view the ideological conflict and its racially-inflected origins. I consider three prominent areas of legal theory and attempt to show how they reveal both the ideological contradictions of Israeli and Palestinian partisans and the roots of those contradictions. First, the affirmative action debate helps illuminate the controversy over Israel's Jewish character and the “Law of Return,” which grants Israeli citizenship to Jews but not to other groups. In addition, the controversy over the Takings Clause sheds light on the Palestinian claim of a “right of return.” Finally, the contributions of critical race theory, particularly its insight into how the notion of race is socially constructed, help us to understand more fully the political alignments (and misalignments) that comprise the Middle East debate. Legal theory, of course, cannot solve the conflict. It can, however, help us understand its roots in a more profound way.
This Essay will proceed in four parts. First, I examine the “Law of Return,” which entrenches Israel's status as a Jewish state. Second, I consider the Palestinian claim of the right of return, which torpedoed the Camp David and Taba negotiations in 2000-2001. Third, I argue that race has structured this conflict, and suggest that, in the Middle East, race is more precisely defined as a geopolitical construction: world politics has pressured Israelis, Palestinians, and their external supporters to view the parties to the conflict in ways that correspond little with the facts on the ground. Finally, I seek to respond to two prominent counterarguments that explain the left-right split through the prism of power or colonialism. Neither explanation, I contend, withstands close scrutiny.
While my account seeks primarily to explain and critique political behavior, I hope that it also points toward a successful resolution of the conflict. Late 2005 and early 2006 witnessed an earthquake in the Middle Eastern political landscape. In Israel, Ariel Sharon bolted the Likud Party, which he founded and turned into the dominant force in Israeli politics; less than two months later, Sharon suffered a career-ending, and life-threatening, stroke, leaving his newly formed Kadima Party supreme on the domestic scene but unsure of the direction in which to take the country diplomatically. Meanwhile, Hamas triumphed in the Palestinian elections, leaving the world shocked and bewildered about what would (or should) come next. At the same time, the crisis over Iranian nuclear capability found the Europeans tiring of fruitless negotiations and agreeing to refer Tehran to the UN Security Council, with the United States agreeing to march in step with a multilateralist approach. It is thus time for a fundamental reexamination of seemingly unchangeable verities. As I suggest in the Conclusion, if the Left and the Right can critically reexamine their assumptions, they may be able to produce a new diplomatic synthesis, one that can progress more effectively toward, if not peace, then at least a more stable and peaceful future for both Israelis and Palestinians.
[. . .]
“The past is never dead,” William Faulkner observed. “It's not even past.” So it is with race, ideology, and the Middle East. More than a decade after the Soviet Union's collapse, and more than three decades after Nasir's death, the twin Cold War geopolitics remain influential. In this case, their influence powerfully distorts the way people think about the Middle East.
The deep contradictions on both the Left and the Right do not simply represent another instance of poorly conceived policy thinking. Instead, they point to a potential way out of the current Middle East impasse. Few doubt that, although the parties must negotiate any final status agreement, such an agreement cannot be reached absent sustained external pressure. Such pressure can best gain strength if the Left and the Right begin to question their own positions.
The current impasse is violent but stable, and supports hardliners on both sides. The Palestinians, backed solidly by the Third World bloc and influential leftwing opinion, see no need to moderate their positions, particularly with respect to refugees. The same applies to the Israelis, ensconced in the warm embrace of rightwing opinion and influential neoconservatives in the Bush Administration and the Republican Party, and thus seeing little need to consider relinquishing large settlement blocs deep inside the West Bank.
If Israelis can no longer be sure of consistent support from the Right, however, and Palestinians find the Left's support similarly uncertain, internal dynamics could shift. Israelis and Palestinians supporting a two-state solution could more effectively argue that negotiating adjustments are necessary given greater diplomatic uncertainty. Arafat only agreed to the Oslo process once faced with the collapse of his power following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Israel has modified its stance only when the United States has threatened 'reassessments' of the special relationship. Uncertainty could force each side to make the key concessions that would produce an overall settlement. Ideological realignment, then, is dictated, not only by political logic, but also by the requirements of peace.
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; J.D. Yale Law School, M.Phil. Cambridge University, Ph.D. Harvard University.
